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l e s t  i n  c o s t ,  development time, r e l i a b i l i t y ,  & p a y l o a d - t o - m b i t  performanc?. None r equ i r e  
new technology nor  has  any s i g n i f i c a n t  growth p o t e n t i a l .  While t h e  SRB-X has  t h e  advantag 
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environment. 
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The Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological Program Reviews 
was created by the National Research Council in June 1981 as h result 
of a request. by the Congress of the United States to the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration that it establish an ongoing 
relationship with the National Academy of Sciences ana the National 
Academy of Engineering for the purpose of yroviainq an inaependent, 
objective review of the scientific and technological merits of NASA 
programs wtenever the Congressional Cokmittees on Appropriations so 
direct.1 
terms of reference, select a suitable panel of experts to carry out 
the task, and review the resulting report betore publication. 
To date 4 tasks have been undertaken: revlews of the 
International solar Polar nission,2 NASA's Aeronautics ~rogram,3 
the Space Shuttle Program,Q and NASA's Numerical Aerodynamic 
Simulation ~rogram.S 
a request by the Congressional Committees on Appropriations to the 
NASA Administrator in late January 1984 for an assessment of the 
advantages an? didadvantages o t  various candidate expendable launch 
vehicles for large payloads (Appendix A). 
ltongEessiona1 Conference Report 96-1476, November 21, 1980. 
lNat ional Research Council, The International Solar Polar Mission--R 
Review and Assessment of Options, 1981,  National Academy Pr':SS, 
Washington, D.C. 
When a review i s  requerted, the committee is called on to set the 
The fifth task, which is the subject of this report, resulted from 
3Na tional Research Council, Aeronautics Research and Technology--A 
Review of ?roposeQ Reductions in the PY 1983 NASA Program, 1982, 
~ ~~~ 
National Academy P r e s s ,  Washing ton, D.C. 
'National Research Council, Assessment of Constraints on Space 
Shuttle Launch Rates, 1983, National ircadeiny Press, Washington, D.C. 
5National Research Council, Review of NASA's Numerical Aerodynamic 
Simulation Program, l Y 8 4 ,  National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 
V 
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The committee m t  on February 14, 1984, to establish term of 
reference (Appendix B) for the review based on the c o n q r ~ 5 S ~ ~ l  
request and to naeinate a panel to undertake the task. 
expertise sought included launch vehicle systems and space aiosion 
requirements from the point of view of WD, W, inauatry, and the 
space science -unity, as well as national space policy and costing 
oi launch systems. 
technical assemaents, it is essential that ro8t have a high degree of 
knowledge in the subject of the study. Since such individual6 may 
appear to have a potential for bias, every effort wa6 nade to achieve 
a balance in background8 and attitudes of the panelists in order to 
present as oojective a report as possible. 
This particular task deals with but one segment of the broader 
issue of natianal space Aaunch system which have far reaching policy 
implications. 
action for expencable launch vehicles, initiated near the time this 
study was begun and still ongoing at i ta  conclusion. 
believe that this report proviaes a useful input to the debate on 
launch systems. 
ana members of the panel and to corcnd them for their timely response 
to the charge. 
W e  ageas of 
In appointing such a group of individuals to M k e  scientific and 
The task was complicated by a ailitary procurerent 
mspitc t h i n ,  I 
The corittee wishes to record its appreciation to the ChaiKun 
Noclan HaCkeKBdn 
Chalman, C m i t t e e  on NASA Scientific and 
Technologacal Program Revrews 
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IntroductLn 
Natiortal space policy c s i e b i i s n e e  the  Space Tran8portaCion Syr ter  
( 6 S )  as the u.S. governaent  means of access to o p e  (Mfermce i r .  
The STS p r e s e n t l y  c o n s i s t s  ot e fleet ot 3 orbiters to br 
SupyAementca by a t u u r t k  i n  early 1985. Theca 10 no f i ta  c o r i t w n t  
to f u r t h c i  product.ron of orbiters; W e v e I ,  t h e r e  is i n  place an 
e x t e n s i v e  program to b u l l a  space subsystems 'tnereby u i n t a i n i n g  
F C o d U C t i O f i  readiness for a t i f t h  orC)&ter' ( R c t c t e x e  2!. Eleven 
o r t . : d r  flights bere successLulAy completed a u r i r q  'crra f i r e t  3 years  
af o p e r a t i o n ,  ma launch r a t e 8  oc 1 4  pet year are p r o l e c t e d  i n  the  
h A S A  mibsion p l a n  tor t h e  l a t e  1580s. In  a n t r c i p d t l o Q  Of a f u l l y  
o p e r a t i o n a l  S T S ,  gciver nment-controctco [lrocluct run of exynoa6le 
l aunch  v e n i c l e s  ( E t V s )  is being j~aafiea o u t .  
k i t h  t n e  growing role of space system in p t o v i d i w j  for r u t i o n e l  
s e c u r i t y ,  the N p a r t a e n t  ot Defense (-0) 11 expected t o  Dt t h e  
l a r y e s t  srngle user ot the  STS, accoutltiny for a t  l e a s t  one-thiro ot 
the y r o ~ e c t e a  i4 f l i g h t s  p e r  y e a r .  Tne IJOD r e c e n t l y  Cal i ra  for 
devel?pment of a n  e x p r x a b l e  lauric? v e h i c l e  t h a t  # ) u ~ a  &e 
conplementary to t h e  STS to y rov ioc  "dbsureG access to a w e .  
\Appendix D ) .  For t h i s  purpose 3 c a n d i d a t e  expendable lairncti 
v e h i c l e s ,  a l l .  w i tn  payioao capabili ty eo geos~ricrarorw~ o r b i t  of a t  
Least 10,OGO l b  (coffiparable to tnar. of the STS) , hdwe men U M P K  
s t u a y  . 
procurement a c t l o n  with a r eques t  fo: proyosale (WDj for a 
commercial buy of 10 complementary equendastie Lsurch ctzhrcles to w 
o e l i v e r e u  a t  t h e  rate  of 2 per y':ar ourrng tiis p e r i o C  PY AY8O-Pi' 
1992. The RPP was subsequent ly  withdrawn anrj re isbuet i  ofi a 
conventiondl yoverrment pUrCna6e b a s ~ s  a t  the  eno of  J u l y  1984, zanU 
procuremerit a c t i o n  was still unaer way a t  the?  t i m e  thr. present s tudy  
was compie tea. 
I n  a d a i t i o n .  w i u  B probable ~ ~ t u r e  ne d fcr: d pirjload c a p s t i l i t y  
b b b s t a n t i a i l y  larger than t h a t  ofterra by t ne  SI'S or the yrop3sed new 
E L V s ,  tmtn NASA Ana t h e  h i r  Force ace stuclying . ,everdl  c u l ~ t i g u r a t l o n s  
using s t i u t t l e  comenen t s .  
Tne cha rge  tc; t h i s  pane l  stems trom a r eques t  maae by Seriator 
Carn  and (:myreson~an Wlan'J (sated Januaiy i5.. 1984) to  NASA 
Adminis t ra tor  Jdmr?S M ,  ijegqs. T h e  s tuoy  r P q u L ) s t ,  as f u r t h e r  def into 
A t  the  end of W r c h  1984,  t h e  U.5. ' . ~ r  Force 1nrL:ated 
1 
by tne National Ressacch Council1s Coamittee on NASA Scientific and 
Tecnnological Program Reviews, can be stated as a review ot :  (1) 
ELVs that could "pcov;ae a flexible back up fot tho space 
transportation system;. and ( 2 )  "advanceu vehicle contigurations that 
Could increase payload to orDit at potentrally reduced Costs." 










large payload requirements of the DoD, NASA, ana the private 
sector ; 
potential payload capabilities of canaidate vehicles; 
aevelclprxnt time; 
adaitional ground support requirements for various 
cano iaate sy S tBIpS; 
payload compatibility tetween tne shuttle and candidate ELVs; 
growth potential; 
cost trade-orfs between candrdete systems; and 
total costs of maintaining a national launcher capability. 
In regaro to ( 2 ) ,  the charge specifically calls for a review of: 
o lu'-ure misbion requirements and potential vehicle 
conf igura tions. 
The panel discussed a number o t  options and concepts for assureu 
access to space in aoaztion to those contained in the charge; 
hobever, tile need for a timely response to the Congressional request 
oictatea oetailed exmiination of requirements, risks and costs on!'.' 
for those expendable launch vehicle concepts whicn hao progressed to 
preliminary aesiyn by either industry or NASA. 
II 
Approach 
The pane l  met a t  t h e  Na t iona l  Academy of Sc iences  i n  Washington, 
D.C., on  A p r i l  12-13, JLne 7-8, ana  J u l y  10-11, 1984. During t h e  
course of its meetings t h e  p a n e l  was b r i e f e d  by NASA pe r sonne l  frsm 
Headquarters and t h e  Marsha l l  Space F l i g h t  Center and by Department 
of Defense personnel  from t h e  Pentagon, t h e  U.S. A i r  Force  Space 
Div i s ion ,  ana t h e  Defense Advanced Research P r o j e c t s  Agency. A L i s t  
o f  b r i e f i n g  personnel  is g i v e n  i n  Appendix E. I n  a a d i t i o n ,  
i n a i v i a u a l  members of t h e  p a n e l  con tac t ed  pe r sonne l  tiom t h e  
i n t e l l i g E x e  commwity and i n d u s t r i a l  concerns  i n  regard  to pro- ected 
space  launcn  requirements.  
Tire U.S. A i r  Force p rocureven t  a c t x m ,  i n i t i a t e d  s h o r t l y  a f i e r  
t h i s  s tuay  was Comniissioned, prevented  t h e  p a n e l  from o b t a i n i n g  
t e c h n i c a l  and cost da ta  from space L u n c h  v e h i c l e  manufacturers.  
Thus, t h e  pane l  re .L f iu  upon p re l imina ry  d a t a  fu rn i shea  by NASA ana  
t h e  DoD. The panel  was provided  w i t h  e x t e n s i v e  cost informat ion  by 
00 th  t h e s e  agenc ie s  ana examinea i t  i n  a e t a i l .  I n  its a n a l y s i s  of  
t h e  d a t a  t h e  pariel tound i n  some cases marked d i f f e r e n c e s  between 
cos: estimates proviaea  by NASA and by the  A i r  i'orce. Accurate cost 
f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  cand ida te  sys tems w i l l  n o t  be a v a i l a b l e  u n t i l  
c o ~  L, 2ctual  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a r e  completed. For t h e s e  reasons ,  t h e  pane l  
conL-dded t h a t  no meaningful cost comparisons coula be made a t  t h i s  
time . 
For t h e  purposes of  t h i s  repor t ,  t h e  pane l  has  detineci "heavy 
l i f t "  a s  l i f t  c a p a b i l i t y  exceeding t h a t  of t h e  STS. 
Furthermore,  i n  t h e  c o n t t x t  of its crAc -ge ,  t h e  pane l  cons ide reo  
only  launch  v e n i c l e s  w i t h  payload c a p b i l i t y  equa l  to and exceeding 
t h a t  of t h e  STS and d i d  no t  address iaiinch v e h i c l e s  cf lesser 
c a p a b i l i t y ,  s u c h  a s  those p r e s e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
invent.wy or under commercial aevelopment. 
The pane l  t o o k  account  of o t h e r  Ntitional Research Council  s t l rd i e s  
such a s  t h e  Assessmerat of Cona t ra in t s_on  Space S h u t t l e  Lzuncil Rates 
(Reference  3 ) ,  as well a s  ;eports and documents t h a t  appear i n  t h e  
l i s t  of r e fe rences .  
The pane' wishes t o  e x p r e s s  its a p p r e c i a t i o n  to  t h e  many members 
ot NASA and t h e  A i r  Force who providerl i n to rma t ion  f o r  the s tudy  and 




Overview of U S .  Launch Operations 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
At the COnCIuslOn of the SUCCeSSfUl W l l O  P K q K a r  a 
Presidential Commission recommended that the United States should 
continue its man-in-space program by the development of a recoveraole 
launch vehicle, the shuttle ,Reference 4 ) .  The cost of developing 
tne shuttle was recognized as high, and the scope of the program was 
expanded to provide a generalized space transportation system-a 
mealrs of trarsporting umannea, as well as manned, payloads from the 
earth to space. Lift or payload rcquirements were established at a 
level to encoapJss all known satellits prg.rams. The characteristics 
Of the military satellites were wall know. afid led to the basic 
performance specifications of the shuttle: bay size 15' dianeter and 
60 '  long, and lift capability to put 65,000 lb into easterly launch 
( l o w  orbit). In aaaition, the DoD requirea a substantial cross-range 
meneuver capability to uermit polar orbit injection without 
overflight of n,:tions that might be unkriendly to the United States. 
if the shuttle met these basic specifications, it COUIQ, in 
principle, seLIIe all users: military, NASA, COinmeKCial, and 
foreign. Wk-2 N.UA agreed to meet these speciticacions, the shuttle 
was declared t5e primary "national launch capability" (Reference 11, 
and t h e  ec.rlier expendable launch vehicles, such as the Thor-Delta, 
Atlas, ana  itan an, were to bt aiscontinued as s o o n  a5 practicable 
(Figures 1 and 2a and b!. Ir: short, the use of thi: shuttle as a 
launcn vehicle became rrandatory for DoD and all government agencies. 
Furthr-more, the pricing policy encouraged the design of satellites 
compatible with the shuttle to make maximum use of the shuttle's 
capabilities as the primary launch vehicle. 
STS DEVEIBPMENT AREAS 
The shuttle program represented an ambitious leap in technology 
that required the soluticn of many problems. ?or a developmental 
program of such xagnitude and complexity, the siibtfle's flights have 
bee.; remarkably successful. However, as can De erpected wrth all 
ng. N o t  ail of the performance complex systems, it is still evo 
Preceding page blank 
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s p c ; f i c a t i o n s  have been set ( p a y h a 0  C a p a b i l i t y  is less than 65,000 
lb ,  cross-range maneuver c a p a b i l i t y  is limited, and t h e r e  are 
limitations on a b o r t i n g  to US. bases). 
p h y s i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  and not  a l l  are capable of launching from t h e  
wes tern  Space and Missile Center .  
p rocedures  also need to  be per fec t ed .  
The S'ps is aependent  upon r e u e i 1 : t y  of m y  of its subsystems 
(solid r o c k e t  booster cases, main engines ,  orbiter). A f a i l u r e  of 
any o f  these reusab le  subsystems may s h u t  aocpn o p e r a t i o n s  u n t i l  the 
problem can be i d e n t i f i e d  and corrected, and a retrofit is performed 
across t h e  e n t i r e  f l e e t .  I n  t h e  past, problems have a r i s e n  that have 
s h u t  down a major space program f o r  as much as a year ,  e.g., t h e  
Apollo 4 tire. Neealess to say ,  f a i l u r e s  or mal func t ions  are not  
unique to reusab le  systems. The April 1983 I n e r t i a l  Upper S t a g e  
f a i l u r e  is a classic example of t h e  l u n i t a t i o n s  on  space l aunches  
when there is total dependence on  a single s y s t e m - i n  t h i s  case, an 
expenaable  upper s t a g e .  
Problems also arise because t h e  STS is not y e t  a mature system. 
nany of t h e  S l S  subsystems must be upgraded to m e e t  performance 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  (e.g., s u s t a i n e d  main engine  performance a t  109 
p e r c e n t  m e r  ana r eauc t ion  of the weight 0 2  the solid rocket  booster 
cases). Systems s p e c i f i c a t i o l r s  on mean time between removai- are not  
vow bei,zg z-t on saae of the riubsystems (e.g., the s h u t t l e  main 
eng ine  o x i d i z e r  and f u e l  pis), and a s u s t a i n i n g  engineer ing  program 
w i l l  be r equ i r ed  to  realrze the fLsr b e n e f i t  of t h e  STs concept.  All 
of t h e s e  changes are nceded to achieve  an a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l  of  
a e p e n a a b i i i t y  of the system. 
I t  is to be expected that t h e  s h u t t l e  w i l l  one day become f u l l y  
o p e r a t i o n a l  and that projected turn-around times w i l l  be achieveci if 
there a r e  no major. a c c i d e n t s  o r  f a i l u r e s .  But as t h e  NASA Advisory 
Counc i l ' s  Task  Force f o r  t h e  Study 9f  the E f f e c t i v e  S h u t t l e  
U t i l i z a t i o c  repxt  dated November 17, 1983, (Reference 5) stated: 
'In its near  s ingleminaed p u r s u i t  of t h e  s h u t t l e  development, NASA 
n a s  moved qu ick ly  to aeclare the STS o p e r a t i o n a l  and to  prepare to 
d i v e s t  1tseJ.f of expendable launch veh ic l e s .  W e  f e e l  t h a t  much 
remains to  be done before  the STS becomes o p e r a t i o n a l  i n  the f u l l  
s e n s e  of the wora. We a r e  cmncerned that the e a r l y  e l i m i n a t i o n  ot 
t he  ELVs would l e a v e  the U.S. w i t h  n e i t h e r  a back-up to  the s h u t t l e  
nor a c t i v e  product ion  l i n e s  of space launch v e h i c l e s  of any kind.' 
I n  airdition, each s h u t t l e  is 
L o g i s t i c  and maintenance 
INDUSTRIAL BASE 
As shown i n  Figures 2a and 2b, unaer c u r r e n t  p l ans ,  a f t e r  1986 
t h e r e  w i l l  be no f u r t h e r  product ion  of  NASA or LmD launch v e h i c l e s  i n  
t h e  u.S. 
component s p a r e s  is underway, there a r e  p i e s e n t l y  no f i rm  p l a n s  f o r  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of a f i f t h  o r b i t e r  to  fo l low d e l i v e r y  of  the f o u r t h  
v e h i c l e  i n  e a r l y  1985. T h i s  imp l i e s  t h e  d isappearance  of  U.S. 
engineer ing  and proauct ion  know-how and c a p a b i l i t y .  In  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  
Altnough e x t e n s i v e  proauct ion  of STS s t r u c t u r a l  ana  
0 hl h - I 0 m 
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Soviet Union is n o t  on ly  b u i l d i n g  a space s h u t t l e ,  bu t  is also 
developing  very neavy l i f t  expendable launch veh ic l e s .  (Reference 6 )  
c o s t l y  and product ion  tune cons iderably  longer .  In t h e  cases of the 
A t l a s  and  ita an 111, s u b c o n t r a c t o r s  and venaors  a r e  a l r e a d y  being 
te rmina ted  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of product ion  l i n e  shutdowns. The normal 
leaa t u a e  tor the manufacture of an expenciaale booster is 
approximately 30 m n t n s  wi th  a n  ongoing product ion  base. I f  one h a s  
to  s t a r t  a launch v e h i c l e  program from 'Scratch" the lead t ime Could 
be 7 to 10 years. For example, the Saturn  V program, using 8- 
e x i s t i n g  technology, r equ i r ed  a d e V e l 0 p m w t  period of approximately 7 
y e a r s  prior to product ion.  
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Figure  2b U.S. Space Munch Vehicle PrOaUCtlOn 
(Note: Weapon syster.! boosters not  included,  i.e., A t l a s  
E, F, ThOT, T i t a n  I, 11) 
COST CONSIDFZATIONS 
Where the payload requires the presence of man, where man himself 
is the Object ot research, or where payload recovery is required, the 
STS provides a unique national capability. However, space launch 
Operations involving manned flight have been more complex and 
expensive than unmanned space operations. In part, the STS was 
plannea to overcome these aisadvantages by recovering the orbiter and 
the solid rocket casings and increasing the traffic to share in the 
overhead costs. Costs are also higher wheq a satellite is designed 
for use in the shuttle since each unit must be man-rated and 
aaaitional aesign loads must be considered.* 
software integration are also more complex, and cleanliness, so vital 
to many missions, is more difficult to maintain in a manned launch 
vehicle. The mixture of unclassified--including international--and 
classified payloads in the STS causes large increases in security 
costs- For the above reasons, it is not clear to the panel from the 
data currently available that the STS can ever be more economical 
than ELVs for launching unmanned DoD payloads. 
Accoralng to NASA representatives, NASA establishes prices for 
STS launch services based on "materials and services." The charge to 
a customer reflects only the incremeytal costs associated with each 
launch and the share of associated operating costs. 
the costs charged to simmercia1 and foreign users, the LbD pays about 
60 percent of this anount; starting in about 1988, DoD may be 
expected to pay the f d l  amount. 
the French government and is still in the early development phase. 
In general, within its range of payload capabilities, it appears 
today tc) be competitive with the bTS as it is currently priced 
(Reference 5, p. 27). This reflects the deliberate policy of 
subsiaization by both countries. 
This means that it must find compatible satellites--that is, 
satellites ready for launcn at the same time and into similar 
orbits. Thls requirement influences the CUS:Om?r'S choice between 
the STS and ELVs, which generally carry one payload or perhaps 2 of 
an identical kina. 
Documentation and 
While these are 
France has developed zr. ELV, the Ariane, which is subsidized by 
T o  be priced competitively, tne STS must carry a capacity load. 
*Criteria in the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight's "Systems Safety 
Requirements ior Manned. Space Flight" far exceed requirements for 
expendable vehicles. In addition to considerations for crew safety, 
satellites must be designed to withstand the high stresses 
encountered in case of an abort. 
IV 
Near-Term Launch Requirements 
There are 4 basic classes of  p o t e n t i a l  u s e r s  o f  space launch 
v e h i c l e s :  DoD and t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  agencies ;  t h e  commercial sector; 
NASA, other government agencies ,  and the space s c i e n c e  and 
a p p l i c a t i o n s  communities; and f o r e i g n  governments. The i a s t  class is 
n o t  cons idered  below s i n c e  'J.S. d e c i s i o n s  reqara ing  launch systems 
w i l l  n o t  be based on such requi remet t s .  
DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE REQUI- 
For DoD ana the v a r i o u s  i n t e l l i g e n c e  agencies ,  space satel l i tes  
have becme e s s e n t i a l .  For example, g l o b a l  communication, mapping 
and r e c o n n a i s s m c e ,  g l o b a l  naviga t ion ,  nuc lear  weapon monitor ing,  
warning ot missile launches,  and weather monitor ing are a l l  dependent 
on c u r r e n t  o p t i a t i o n a l  s a t e l l i t e  systems. The Army, Navy, and A i r  
Force have become heavi ly  dependent on satel l i tes  i n  day-to-day 
tact ical  o p e r a t i o n s .  Recognizing t h a t  these space systems nave 
become necessary  for U.S. s e c u r i t y ,  a n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  was e s t a b l i s h e d  
that called tor a s s u r e a  a c c e s s  to space (Reference 1). S t a t i n g  that  
t h e  STS, wh i l e  a g r e a t  n a t i o n a l  asset, d id  not  provide  for such 
a s s u r e d  access to  space, the S e c r e t a r y  of Defense e s t a b l i s h e d  a DoD 
Space P o l i c y  c a l l i n g  for a complementary launch system t o  t h e  STS 
(Appenaix D ) .  H e  sa id  a "high conf idence  of access to  Space'' is 
"needed for a l l  l e v e l s  of c o n f l i c t  to meet the requirements  of 
n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  missions." H e  cont inued,  "While DoD p o l i c y  
requires assured access to space  across t h e  spectrum of  c o n f l i c t ,  t h e  
a b i l i t y  to s a t i s f y  t h i s  requirement  is c u r r e n t l y  unachievable  'if t h e  
U.S. mainland is subjected to  direct  attack. Therefore ,  t h i s  launch 
s t r a t e g y  aadresses an assurea launch c a p a b i l i t y  o n l y  through l e v e l s  
of c o n f l i c t  i n  which it is postulated t h a t  t h e  U.S. hcmelana is not  
unaer direct  attack." 
On tile basis of  t h e s e  p o l i c y  s ta tements ,  the A i r  Force i n i t i a t e d  
procurement a c t i o n  f o r  a n  ELV complementary to the s h u t t l e .  S e v e r a l  
c u r r e n t  s a t e l l i t e  programs opt imized f o r  STS launch, whi le  compatible 
f o r  launch by t h e  STS wi th  t h e  upper s t a g e  Cent:ur, cannot  be 
11 
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launched by any previous ELV.* If, therefore, an ELV complementary 
to the STS for launch into these high obbits (synchronous at 10,000 
lb, or highly elliptical at 15,000 lb--and with large dimensions) 18 
required, it must necessarily be a grawth version of a previous ELV 
or a new ELV, both in throw weight and payload shroud dimensions. As 
a result, the Air Force has establisCed a minhum throw weight 
capability to synchronous orbit of 10,000 lb which, according to Ait 
Force briefers, accommodates all the near-term missions surveyed by 
the panel. 
Need for Assured Access to Space: Peacetime 
While DoD has prioritv over any other user of the STS, the noma1 
planning cycle (e.g., orbital planning, security provisions, software 
integration) takes approximately 6 mont'is. Should circumstances 
arise deaanding an immediate D o D  satellite replacement, it will be 
difficult to reauce this time substantially. 
In the past, the DoD has been able to achieve excellent security 
through the autonomy of a dedicated launch facility. It has proven 
to be much more difficult and costly to maintain adequate security 
using the STS. Also, it may be necessary to launch a sensitive ana 
militarily important security satellite without the public exposure 
that has become the norm in NASA flight operations. 
With only the STS available it may become imperative to Freempt 
other scheauled STS users and scheduled STS launches might be lost 
due to DoD requirements for immediatc replacement of satellites in 
existing systems. Obviously, this kind of action might inhibit 
potential STS users. 
failure in the system coula shut down the nation's ability to conduct 
space launch operatiom. Problems with the unique suppliers or 
support contractors coula cause a stoppage in launches. The impact 
of s u a  occurrences would be far more significant than that caused by 
similar problems in the current diverse fleet of ELVS. 
AS noted in Chapter 111, with a limited shuttle fleet, a generic 
Need for Assured Access to Space: Time of Crisis 
In a crisis, the situation woula be altered. The STS would have 
to overfly the Soviet Union, putting the crew and vehicle at some 
risk, in order to put a satellite in a polar orbit required for DoD 
missions. An unmanned expendable launch vehicle, on the other hand, 
woula allow the I)oD to support defense space Systems with no risk to 
man, less political risk, and no hazara to the limited STS fleet. 
*Earlier launchers allowed for a payload diameter up to 10 ft and 
will not accommodate a 15 ft payload. 
the capability of existing ELVs. 
Payload weight may also exceed 
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In the past, the DoD has been able to achieve rapid response by 
storage of a satellite ana its launch vehicle on the launch pad. 
This is very difficult to do using the STS. In time of crisis the 
comparatively long operational recycle time of the STS limits its 
utility in support ot time-urgent military space missions. 
The security aavantages offerei by a deaicatea launch facility, 
as discussed under "Peacetune' above, become even more important in 
time of crisis. 
COMMERCIAL REQUIREMENTS 
Cn-mercial use of space, presently dominated by the 
communications satellite industry, is ariven by costs. An important 
contribution to costs Fs the reliability of launch vehicles and 
firmness of scheduled launch dates. Commercial satellites are built 
in anticipation of using existing launch vehicles ana cannot be 
expected to generate demand for new vehicles. If new vehicles or 
their components are developea, commercial users will certainly 
consider their uses. 
In development cf a riew ELV, dual manifesting is another 
important consiaeration to the commercial sector. As stated, the 
anticipated throw weight of the proposed ELVs to synchronous orbit 
would oe at least 10,nOO lb, more than is forecast in the near-term 
neeas of the largest commercial user. To be cost competitive, a 
two-satellite launch adapter similar to the Ariane SYLDk (zsteme de 
- Lancement Double 'giane") would be required on the new ELV in order 
to launch 2 spacecraft at once. Incorporation of an adapter to make 
it compatible with STS and Ariane would have some impact on the 
aesign of the ELV. Dual manifesting O t  commercial satellites 1s 
presently carried out on both STS and Ariane without major 
inconvenience to the user and must be a major design consiaeration if 
the proposed new system is to be used by commercial enterprises. 
REQUIREMJBlTS OF NASA AND OTHER USERS 
The NASA initiatives which have led to U.S. eminence in space are 
well known and need iiot be repeated here. 
study, NASA representatives, in their briefings to the panel, April 
12, 1984, stated that all of their requirements could be met by the 
STS and, therefore, tney have no need for an ELV of comparable 
performance. Tne Space Science Boar0 of the National Research 
Council is undertaking a study of the major directions for b;pace 
science for the period 1995-2015. The study Will assume the 
availability of space station, STS, ana ELVs and could lead to 
consiaeration of requirements for launching heavier payloads than 
those presently anticipated. However, at the present time, no 
science missions are planned that require 6 capability greater than 
the STS. Department of Commerce needs a150 would be met by the STS 
inasmuch as their requirements are included in the NASA pro~ections. 
In the context of this 

V 
Candidate Expendable Launch Vehicles 
The 3 vehicle systems under consideration by the Air Force to 
complement the Sm--the Titan 34D7/Centaur, the ~ t l a s  11, an3 the 
.shuttle-aeriveo SRB-X--all have the potential for launching 10,000 lb 
into geosynchronous orbit. All use a version of the Centaur G for the 
upper stage and all are based on proven technologies ana in large part 
on proven haraware elements. 
characteristics for these systems are given in Figures 3 to 5 ana 
T a b l e  :. 
Descriptions ana perfonnance 
(4) 67.0' DIA 
SOLID ROCKET 
MOTORS 
(5) H - 1D 
ENGINES 
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Figure courtesy USAF 
THE ATLAS 11 
The Atlas II/Centaur represents a reaesign of the Atlas G. Its 
aiameter is increased from iZ0 inches for the current Atlas to 200 
Preceding page blah 15 
16 
inches. The Centaur G ' ,  which is being developed f o r  t h e  STS, w i l l  be  
used for tne upper s t a g e .  
5 Aiquia rocket engines  and 4 strap-on s o l i d  rocket motors, a l l  Of 
which use  e x i s t i n g  des igns .  The g e n e r a l  concept for the A t l a s  I1 
s u g g e s t s  that e s t a b l i s h e d  technology and proven hardware w i l l  be 
used. The l i q u i d  rocke t  engines  being cons ide rea  f o r  use are of  
proven l i n e a g e ;  t h e i r  development was i n i t i a t e d  over  30 y e a r s  ago. 
Never the less ,  the A t l a s  I1 is s t r u c t u r a l l y  a new launch v e h i c l e  wi th  
cor re spona ing r i s k s .  
The Atlas I1 propuls ion  system consists of 
, CENTAUR / G-PRIME 
h 
I L U .  / PAYLOAD 
/ 
7 SEGMEN' ^--- I SHM
I Lw'n.u'A I1 5 ft dia 
x 40 ft long) 
Figure courtesy USAF 
Figure  4 T i t a n  34D7/Centaur 
THE TITAN 34D7 
The  T i t a n  34D7/Centaur is an upgraded T i t an  I I I E  v e h i c l e ,  which 
was usea s u c c e s s r u l l y  i n  NASA p l a n e t a r y  programs i n  the l a t e  1970s. 
The s o l i d  rocket s t a c k  of t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  has  been increased  from 5 . 5  
to  7 seyments,  t h e  t anks  on :.he secona- ana t h i r d - s t a g e  l i q u i a  rocket 
e n g i p e s  a r e  increased  i n  l eng th ,  ana i9e new Centaur G '  rocke t  forms 
t h e  f o u r t h  s t age .  A seven-segment solia rocke t  s i m i k r  to t h e  one 
p r o j e c t e d  for the T i t a n  34D7, t h e  T i t a n  I11 pi, was unaer aevelopment 
i n  1966-68 for a p p l i c a t i o n  on t h e  Air Force Mannea Orb i t ing  Laboratory 
(MOL) ana 4 test  f i r i n g s  were made w i t h  varying degrees  ot success 
b e t o r e  the program was te rmina tea .  Although t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
m o a i f i c a t i o n s  a r e  lesser than those f o r  t h e  At l a s ,  t h e r e  is still  
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Figure courtesy NASA 
F i g u r e  5 SRB-X/Centaur 
THE SRB-X 
Tne SRB-X launch v e h i c l e  system is also an  assemblage of rockets 
developed i n  o t n e r  v e h i c l e s  and proven i n  many s u c c e s s f u l  f l i g n t s .  
The t i r s t  s t a g e  c o n s i s t s  ot 2 four-segment solia rockets i d e n t i c a l  
w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  of t h e  s h u t t i e .  Tne secona s t a g e  is a 
three-segment v a r i a t i o n  of t h e  f i r s t  solia s t a g e  w i t h  a mad i f i ca t ion  
to  t h e  burning r a t e  of t n e  rocket f u e l .  T h e  t h i r d  s1age is 
e s s e n t i a l l y  an  unmoaif led v e r s i o n  ot a s t a n a a r a  T i t a n  secona s t age .  
The upper ( f o u r t h )  s t a g e  is b Centaur rocket i a e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  one 
under aevelopment for  the s h u t t l e .  However, because the  f i r s t - s t a g e  
S o l i d  R o c k e t  Boosters h w e  been spaced to u t i l i z e  STS launch 
f ac i l i t i e s ,  aevelopment of a t r u s s  w i l l  be requi red  making t h e  SHB-X. 
l i k e  t h e  A t l a s  11, e s s e n t i a l l y  a new launch v e h i c l e  w i t h  some 
cor responaing r icks .  
TABLE I COMPARATIVE ELV DATA 
T34D7/CENT G '  ATLAS II/CENT G '  SRE-X/CENT G' 
~ ~ ~~ ~~~~ ~ 
Liftoff  We ioh t ( lb )  1.91 X lG6 1 . 6 2  X l o 6  3 .74  x 106 
Liftoff Thrust  , ' b) 2 . 8  x 106 2.27 X 106 5 . 8 0  X 106 
( 2  SOlldS) ( 5  l i q u i d  e n g i n e  ( 2  s o l i d s )  
+ 4 s o l i d s )  
Thr u s  +./weight 1 .46  1 .4b  1 .55  
Tr a J ec t o r  ies 
Park OrLit ( m i * )  84  x i o 2  80  X 104 130 c i r c u l a r +  
TransLer (nmi) 95 X 19 ,324  90 X 1 9 , 4 2 1  100 x 19,323+ 
Performance to Geo. [lb) 10,500 11 ,000  11 ,500  
* N a u t i c a l  miles 
+NASA f i g u r e s  
Courtesy of The Aerospace Corporat ion 
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LAO NCH PAC I L I T 1  ES 
The A i r  Force proposes to modify t h e  Ti tan  111 Launch Complex 41 
a t  the E a s t e r n  Space ana Missile Center  for launch of either the T i t a n  
34D7/Centaur or t h e  Atlas II/Centaur.  Rework of t h e  area ana its 
equipment w i l l  be Lequirea for e i t h e r  * r e h i d e ,  b u t  t h e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  
for t h e  Atlas  I J  w i l l  be mors e x t e n s i v e  than t h o s e  for t h e  Ti tan .  
Complex 41 has not  been i n  u s e  s i n c e  t h e  T i t a n  IIIE p l a n e t a r y  
launching i n  1977 and aaintenarrce h a s  been minimal. Rework or 
replacement of  the stana, t h e  mobile s e r v i c e  tower, t h e  umbilical 
tower, and t h e  associated equipment ana ins t rumenta t ion  w i l l  be 
r e q u i r e d  . 
The SRB-X would be launched from t h e  s h u t t l e  Launch Pad 39B a t  
Kennedy Space Center r e q u i r i n q  some m o a i f i c a t i o n s  to its f i x e d  ana 
r o t a t i n g  s e r v i c e  structures. Modif ica t ions  w i l l  also be necessary for 
one n igh  Day cel l  of  the Vehic le  Assembly Building ana for the Mobile 
Launch Platform. A hypergol ic  f u e l  system w i l l  be neeaed f o r  the 
t h i r d  s t a g e .  A s  noted above, t h e  four-segment solid rocket motors of 
t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  have been spaced as on t h e  sh*; t t le  so t h a t  t h e  exhaust 
v e n t s  on the s h u t t l e  mobile launch platform may be used w i t h o u t  
m o d  i f  i c a  t ion. 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
The  u n i t  costs and t e c h n i c a l  c a p a b i l i t y  of the 3 systems examine0 
appear to be comparable. As stated i n  the I n t r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e  A i r  Force 
is c u r r e n t l y  cons ider ing  b ids  for s u c h  a system and, hence, i t  1s 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  for the panel  to  comment f u r t h e r .  Air Force procurement 
procedures s h o u l d  be adequate  to select a:) a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  
t o  meet m i l i t a r y  requirements.  However, some g e n e r a l  o b s z r v a t i o n s  
might De made w i t h o u t  p r e j u d i c i n g  t h e  procurement process .  
The T i t a n  34D7 u s e s  l a r s e l y  proven hardware and o b t a i n s  growth 
through elements  prev ious ly  aemonstrated.  I t  can u s e  Launch Complex 
41 a t  Cape  Canaveral ,  t h u s  making it independent of the  STS l z i i c h  
f a c i l i t i e s .  This  avoids  possible b o t t l e n e c k s  t ha t  might a r i se  -f t h e  
STS launch pads were used, t h u s  present ing  a decided adt-ar.tage for 
t imely  assured access  t o  space. 
The  Atlas  growth v e r s i o n  i s  l a r g e l y  a new v e h i c l e  a l though based 
on proven A t l a s  technoiogy. I t  shares many of t h e  advantages of the 
T i t a n ,  e.g. ,  u s e  of developed engines  and Launcn Complex 41. However, 
i t  r e p r e s e n t s  a l a r g e r  a e p a r t u r e  from e x i s t i n g  aes igns .  
The  SRB-X enlo)-s t h e  synergism with t h e  STS of using its s o l i d  
rocket w o s t e r s  (SRBs).  The spacing between t h e  e x t e r n a l  SRBS m a k e  
t h e  v e h i c l e  wider than otherwise necessary.  The i n i t i a l  launch pad 
m o d i f i c a t i o n  costs are comparable t o  costs o f  modiiying Launch Complex 
41; b u t  there i b  a r i s k  of t y i n g  up a c r i t i c a l  f a c i l i t y  and p r e s e n t i n g  
d s i n g l e  t a i l u r e  ncae. The p a n e l  noted t h a t  t h e  take-off rreight Of 
t h e  SW-X is  approximately twice t h a t  of either of the otlier 2 ELVs 
w h i l e  the  costs appear to  be comparable. When questionetr ,  NASA 
































U sr C n aJ u a 
0)  a 
rl 
0, -4 a m 

















a h  n u  
3: 
UJa 
m P  
0 0  




U a>. u s  
a x  
o s  
m a  
Q O  







r l m  
J J a l  
a 
o m  








o m  
- c m  
U Q  
0 . 4  
n 
Q U  




n U  
e r l  
22 
o f  l a r g e r  solid r o c k e t s  f o r  the f i r s t  stage and a solia second Stage, 
and the costs were n o t ' p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  g r e a t e r  because o f  t h e  r e u s a b l e  
f e a t u r e s  o f  the f i r s t  stage and the advantage o f  a broadened 
p roduc t ion  base for the SRBs that are used f o r  both f i r s t  and second 
s t a g e s  of the SRB-X. 
Each of t h e s e  v e h i c l e s ,  once developed, o f f e r s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  
a p p l i c a t i o n  to  non-DoD miss ions  now allocatetj to the STS; t h i s  raises 
policy q u e s t i o n s  no t  adaressed by this panel .  
Hone of  t h e  3 candiaate systems appears to have any s i g n i f i c a n t  
growth p o t e n t i a l *  wi thou t  major reconf igu ra t ion .  Nor ao any of  the 
c a n a i a a t e  vehicles r e q u i r e  a e v e l o p r e n t  of  new technology. A s r a a r y  
a s s e s s r e n t  o f  t h e  3 s y s t e m  is presen ted  i n  Table 11. 
COS" CONSIDERATIONS POR CANDIDATE ELVS 
The pane l  w a s  provided w i t h  p r e l m i n a r y  NASA and A i r  I 'orce cost 
estxrates for the 3 candiaate systems. Sore of the i n f o n a t i o n  is 
p r o p r i e t a r y  and s u b j e c t  to ref inement  i n  the COUKS~ o f  t h e  oirgoing 
A i r  Force prceurement a c t i o n s .  Therefore ,  s p e c i f i c  dollar f i y x e s  
are n o t  used here in .  
alscrepancies i n  NASA and A i r  Force cost estinates; k h a t  Oreakdcwns 
were a v a i l a b l e  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  there are c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
the cost e s t i m a t i o n  processes. 
regarded as s i g n i f i c a n t  compared to  the estimates f o r  the total 
expense of  the n a t i o n a l  space launch system. 
I n  the o p i n i o n  of the panel ,  incrementa l  costs to t%e n a t i o n ' s  
l aunch  program of t h e  order o f  $2 b i l l i o n  tor the launches  du r ing  the 
5-year pe r iod  should  be cofi tenplated no matter which v e h i c l e  system 
1s chosen. A p o r t i o n  of this sum would be o f f s e t  i n  the A i r  Force 
bcdget  by e l i m i n a t i o n  of 10 DoD-scheauled STS launches,  b u t  
commercial costs ana cost' to NASA w i l l  be higher  u n l e s s  t h e  vaca ted  
m i l i t a r y  f l i g h t s  can  be bold to other customers.  
Documentation a v a i l a k i e  to the pai;el was i n s u f f i c i e n t  to r e s o l v e  
m v e r ,  the d i f f e r e n c e s  are not 
*Herein,  .growth p o t e n t i a l "  is taken to lrean t h e  i n h e r e n t  a b i l i t y  to  
moaify or upgraae performance of  a space boos ter  w i t h o u t  i complete 
redes ign  or the  e n t i r e  system. 
VI 
Future Heavy Lift Launch Vehicles 
As indicated earlier, t h e r e  c u r r e n t l y  e x i s t s  no v a l i a a t e a  
requi rement  for l aunch  v e h i c l e s  w i t h  performance exceeding t h e  
STS/Centaur or proposed complementary ELVs. However, it is 
unders tooa  that f u t u r e  DcXl mi s s ions  may r e q u i r e  launching large 
pay loads  sucn as those associated wi th  s u r v e i l l a n c e ,  cosspunicaticns, 
and the Strategic Defense I n i t i a t i v e  (Reference 7).  For example, the 
SDI miss ions  MY r e q u i r e  payloads i n  the ! snge of 1308000 to  200,000 
lb (2eterence 8 )  ana there may be a requirement for launching very  
l a r g e  payloads  such as "tankers.  f o r  l o g i s t i c s  support to  f u t u r e  
space o p e r a t i o n s  (e.g.8 Reference 9) and e x p l o r a t i o n s .  I t  is t h e  
p a n e l ' s  judgement, bas& on t h e  historical  growth of satell i te 
sys tems,  that o n - o r b i t  weight is h igh ly  leveraged  i n t o  improved 
sys tems performance. 
ccmmunications c a p a c i t y  of satel l i tes  is c u r r e n t l y  grawing more 
r a p i d l y  than  their weight. 
aeve lopea  i n  coming y e a r s  (e.g., for t u t u r e  I n t e l s a t s )  because they 
might be more cost e f f e c t i v e  and, even more impor tan t ly ,  because 
space i n  geosyncmonous o r k i t  is r a p i a l y  becoming scarce. The 
STS-Centaur p rov ides  for growti, up to 10,000 l b .  Beyond h a t ,  l a r g e r  
and heav ie r  payloads  a r e  n o t  l i k e l y  to be developed u n t i l  su i tab le  
launch v e h i c l e s  are a v a i l a b l e .  
Regaraing u s e  of heavy l i f t  by t h e  commercial sector, t h e  
Somewhat l a r g e r  satell i tes may be 
HEAVY LIFT VEHICLE CONCEPlS 
I n  oraer to meet potential  long-term needs, both NASA aria the 
U.S. A i r  Force a r e  pursu ing  s t u d i e s  of a number of unmanned launch 
v e h i c l e s  w i t h  payload l i f t  c a p a b i l i t i e s  up to 450,000 l b  to l o w  e a r t h  
o r D i t  and up to  140,000 l b  to  geosynchronous orbit .  I n  the p r e s e n t  
s tud ies ,  payload s i z e s  of a t  least  25 t t  i n  diameter and 90 f t  i n  
l e n g t h  coula be accommodated. TheEe v e h i c l e s  a l l  u t i l i z e  components 
of t h e  space  s h u t t l e  i n  some i c r m  s u c h  as s o l i d  r o c k e t  b o o s t e r s  
(SRB), space s h u t t l e  m a i f ,  e n g i n e s  i.iSME), exteLrra1 ?=nu (ET) 
S e c t i o n s ,  and an crlmanned o r b i t e r  a t x i v a t i v e  ca rgo  c a r r i e r ,  aRa, 
therefoie, r e p r e s e n t  e x i s t i n g  technology. 
c s r g o  v e n i c l e  aild a "side-mount" c o n t i g u r a t i o n ,  some v e r s i o n s  ot 
which are shown i n  Fi$;;;e?s 6 and 7. 



















The pane l  c o n s i d e r s  these unmanned launch v e h i c l e  (ULV) Concepts 
8s v i a b l e  cand ida te s  to  meet f u t u r e  heavy l i f t  launch requirements .  
The pane l  endorses  the ULV s t u d y  programs bu t  notes t h a t  they do not 
appear  l i k e l y  to r e s u l t  i n  any s i g n i f i c a n t  improvement i n  cost per 
pound to orbit .  
development i n  launch v e h i c l e  technology wi th  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  to 
lowering cost to orbi t  i n  a d d i t i o n  to  the usua l  g o a l s  o f  performance 
and r e l i a b i l i t y .  S ince  e f f i c i e n t  upper s t a g e s  reduce the s i z e  and 
cost of lower s t a g e s ,  u s e  of high-energy p r o p e l l a n t s  for a d d i t i o n a l  
s t a g e s  should be explored .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  more emphasis is needed on 
l i q u i d  r o c k e t  technology. 
I t  should be noted  that once technology r e a d i n e s s  is achieved,  
the aevelopment c y c l e  for a f u t u r e  heavy l ift launch v e h i c l e  would 
normally span 5 to 7 yea r s .  
AS a f i n a l  no te ,  the pane l  believes the n a t i o n  should l o o k  beyond 
the immeaiate requirement  for complementary ELVS and begin to l a y  
p l a n s  for the next  g e n e r a t i o n  of launch v e h i c l e s  w i t h  g r e a t e r  l i f t  
C a p a b i l i t y .  I t  further obse rves  that over  the y e a r s  NASA and the DoD 
have worked c l o s e l y  t w e t h e r  to  j o i n t l y  d e f i n e  U.S. space  launch 
v e h i c l e  needs and s t r o n g l y  endorses t h i s  process for f u t u r e  launch 
v e h i c l e s  . 
The pane l  t h e r e f o r e  stresses t h e  need for new re sea rch  and 
VI I 
Findings 
Cons i s t en t  wi th  t h e  s p e c i f i c  charge,  which was to examine 
c a n d i d a t e  complementary launch v e h i c l e s  and heavy l i f t  v e h i c l e  






The complementary ELV as a means to a more as su red  access to  
space has unique a t t r i b u t e s  cf o p e r a t i o n a l  f l e x i b i l i t y  and 
s e c u r i t y  no t  provided by t h e  STS alone.  
The 3 c a n a l d a t e s  presentecl by government agenc ie s  to 
the panel  ( t h e  A t l a s  11, T i t a n  34D7, and SRB-x) were juciged 
to  be roughly e q u i v a l e n t  i n  cost, schedule ,  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  and 
payload-to-orbi t  performance. None of the 3 r e q u i r e s  new 
technology. None h a s  s i g n i f i c a n t  growth p o t e n t i a l .  
Tne A t l a s  I1 and T i t a n  34D7 have an important  advantaga over 
the sm-X i n  a s s u r i n g  t i m e l y  access  to  space i n  that they 
are launched independent ly  of t h e  complex STS launch 
env i r o m e n  t . 
Inasmuch as the STS is to remain t h e  n a t i o n ' s  p r i n c i p a l  
access t o  space,  it is e s s e n t i z l  t h a t  bo th  DoD and NASA 
con t inue  s t rong  e f f o r t s  to develop it i n t o  a mature 
o p e r a t i o n a l  system. 
Zeavy L i f t  Vehic les  
1. There a r e  p r e s e n t l y  no v a l i d a t e d  requirements  t h a t  exceed 
the launch c a p a b i l i t y  of the s h u t t l e  o r  complementary launch 
veh ic l e s .  
2. Doll and NASA stuaies i n d i c a t e  t h e  possible f u t u r e  need f o r  
launch v e h i c l e s  w i t h  c a p a b i l i t i e s  equ iva len t  to p lac ing  i n  
l o w  ear th  o r b i t  payloads i n  excess  of 200,000 l b .  
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3. These capabilities can be satisfied by the application of 
existing shuttle components and technology used in unmanned 
cont igurat ions. 
4. Effort8 are required to reduce substantially the cost per 
pound to orbit by the development and application of 
advancd. technologies, simplified design, and improved 
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Appendix A 
Honorable James H. Zeggs 
Admi nis t r a  t o r  
Naticnai Aeronautlcs and Space 
400 Paryland Avenue, Southwes': 
Nasnlngton, D. C. 20516 
Dear Hr. Administrator: 
Admi n i  s t r a t i  on 
I n  recent years both NASA and the A i r  Force have worked on advanced 
eltpendable vehicle configurations that could increase payload t o  o r b i t  
a t  potent ia l ly  reduced costs and provide a f l e r l b le  backup for the space 
transpcrtation system. Some of these potential configurations a r e  shutt le 
derived expendable launch vehicles (ELV) i n  that they employ r w r e n t  o r  
m d i f i e d  shut t le  systems such as the s o l i d  booster, external tank and 
main engines. Other configurations Include an advanced seven segment 
7 1 t m  and a new A t l a s .  
ft appears that  the c,tate o f  analysls has reached a point  where de f i n i t i on  
studies n o w  be i n l t i a t a d  -- looking t o  the mst promlsing candidate f o r  
t h i s  role. I n  view o f  the array o f  posslble shutt le derived and non-shuttle 
derived candidates; and the complexity o f  economfc, technical and future 
mission considcratlons, the Congress would benefft from an early, inde rdcnt 
perform vrr lous el ternat ive mission scenarios. The Approprist!on Cormnittees 
w e  par t leu lor ly  concerned wi th  the potent ia l  payload c r p a b i l l  t ies;  development 
ti=; addltlonal round %upport n q u i m n r n t  f o r  v i r ious candldate systems; 
between t b t  candldatr systems -- includrng the effect o f  such systems on the 
t o t r l  cost o f  w l n t a i n i i i g  L national lruncher coybl14ty .  
The Appmpt i i t ion Com;lltterr requests that  NASA have the Nattonrl 
Acrdmy of Engineering argrbl I s h  an independent nvlw connf ttn to  preprre 
a amprehenrive rsresrnwnt that w i l l  focus on tht oort effect ive cmd ld r t r r  
considering both r e a l i s t i c  future s lssion r q u l r m n t s  and the cost. 
assessment o f  the advantages and dlsrdvantager o f  candidate l i V  ve + c w t o  
payload co;npatlbi P i t y  between the shut t le  rnd crndldrte ElVs;  cost trade offs 
33 
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I t  i s  q u e s t e d  that this s JI r be rubmltted by September 
Thank you for your usual cooperation. 
, 1984. 
aL-24 
House Appropriations Subcomni ttec 
on HUD-Independent Agencies 
in 
Senate Appropriations Subconml ttee 
on HUD- Independent Agencies 
Appendix B 
STATE.WNT OF.- TASK 
AN ASSESSMENT OF CANDIDATE EXPENDABLE LAUNCH V E H I C m @ E  
LARGE PAYLOADS 
The National Academy ot Sciences/National Academy of Engineering 
through the National Research Council contracted to furnish the 
National Aeronautics and Space kdministrrtion, tnrough the NASA Chief 
Engineer, an assessment of Canaidate Expenaable Launzh Vehicles i x  
Large Payloads in response to Congressional request. T 5 i s  stuay is 
the fLfth task under a broader contractual arrangement w i t h  NASA. In 
a letter aated Januari 25, 1984, from Senator Garn ana Congressman 
Boland to tne NASA Administrator, requesting the task, It was asked 
that the study be completed and its results scbmittea to the House 
and Senate ApFropriations committees by September 1, 1984. 
To deal with the request for carryin*; out reviews of NASA 
programs, the NRC established the committee cn NASA Scientific and 
Technological Program Reviews in 1981. In order to adaress diverse 
problems, the Committee nas been authorized to establish ad hoc 
review panels, of which this--the panel to assess Canaidate 
ExpenuaDle L a ~ n c h  Vehicles--is the fifth. 
The charge to the pa:iel, ksea on the Congxessioqal request, is 
to prepare an assessment 31 shuttle-class exptnaable iauwh vehicles 
with primary emphasis on 1) increased payload to orbit, 2) 
potentially reduced cost, anr. 3) provision of a flexible back-up for 
the space shuttle. Specifically requested is: 
o an assessment of tuture large payloaa requirements of NASA, 
DoD, 2nd the private sector tor standard launch vehicles and 
adaitional stages 
o an assessment of the advantages ant? disadvantages of 
canaidate expenaablc launch vehicles, both shuttle-derived 
and other, to meet these requirements accountiny for: 
o system developent time and risk 
G ground support requirements 
o ground facilities requirements 
o payload compatibility with the shuttle 
o growth potential for future mission concepts 
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o cost trade o f f s  between candidate systems, i nc lud icg  
:he e f f e c t  of such cystems on t h e  total  cost of 
d i v e r s i f y i n g  the n a t i o n a l  launch c a p a b i l i t y  for 
l a r g e  payload j c m p a i a b l e  costs to be basea on 
a v a i l a b l e  a s t i m a t e s  f r m  appropr i a t e  n r g a n i e a t i o n s ) .  
In c a r r y i w  o u t  t h i s  t a s k ,  account. shou ld  be t aken  of r e c e n t  
s tuaies  by UIQ N E ,  tWU, t n e  A i r  Force and aerospace c o n t r a c t o r s .  . 
It  1s a n t i c i p a t e d  t h a t  NASA and USAF w i l l  p rovide  informat ion  on 
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  E t u d i e s  necessary  to  the conduct  of this reviev .  
I t  is reques ted  t h a t  the task L e  ccnnpleted arid t h e  r e p o r t  be 
torwaraed to  the Committee on  NASA S c i e n t i f i c  and Technological  
Program Rev iews  no l a t e r  t han  August 1, 1984. 
Committee on NASA S c i e n t i t i c  and Technological  Program Reviews 
Wash ing ton  , D .C . 
February 2 4 ,  1984 
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
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ME'fORANDUM FQ SECRETARItS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 
CHAIRWN OF TH5 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE 
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
SUBJECT: Oefense Space Launch Strategy 
On 23 January 1984, I approved the attached Defense Space Launch Strategy. 
The approach described i n  t h i s  document w l l l  be used t o  guide future defense 
space launch p' .Ining. Please ensure maximum d i s t r i b r t i o n  t o  a l l  those affected 
within your departments and agencies. 
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DEFENSE SPACE LAUNCH STRATEGY 
POL 1 CY 
Defense space launch strategy has been developed i n  response t o  validated 
DoD assured space launch requirements and implements the launch po l i c i es  con- 
tained i n  the Nationa! Space Pol icy  and the Defense Space Policy. The National 
Space Pol icy  ident i f ies  the Space Transportation System (STS) as the primary 
U.S. government space launch vehicle, but recognizes that  unique national 
secur i ty  requirements may d i c ta te  the development of  special purpose launch 
capabi l i t ies .  The Defense Space Pol icy  states that :  
% i l e  af f i rming i t s  comnitment t o  the STS, DoD w i l l  
ensure the avai 1 abi 1 i ty o f  an adequate 1 aunch capabi 1 i ty  
t o  provide f l e x i b l e  and operat ional ly responsive access 
t o  space, as needed f o r  a l l  levels s f  conf l ic t ,  ti, meet 
the requirements o f  nat ional  secur i ty  missions.” 
REQUl REMENTS 
The DoD has a validated requirement f o r  an assured launch capab i l i t y  
under peace, c r i s i s  and c o n f l i c t  conditions. Assured launch capabi l i ty  
i s  a funct ion o f  sat is fy ing two speci f ic  requirements -- the need f o r  comp?e- 
w n t a r y  launch systems t o  hedge against Jnforeseen technical and op?rationa! 
problems, and the need f o r  a launch sybtem sgited f o r  operations i n  Crisis and 
c o n f l i c t  si tuations. While Do0 po l i cy  requires assured access t o  space across 
the spectrum o f  cac f l i c t ,  the a b i l i t y  t o  satisfy t h i s  requirement i s  carrent ly  
unachievable i f  the US mainland i s  subjected t o  d i rec t  attack. Therefore. 
t h i s  launcn strategy’ addresses an assured l a - w h  capab i l i t y  only through levels 
Df c o n f l i c t  i n  which i t  i s  postulated that  the U.S. homelad i s  not under 
d i rec t  attack. Additional s u r v i v a b i l i t y  options beyond an assured launch 
capab i l i t y  are being pursued t o  ensure sustained operations o f  c r i t i c a l  space 
assets af ter  homeland attack. 
STRATEGY 
Near Term: Exist ing Defense space launch olanning s w c i f i e s  tha t  DoD 
w i l l  r e ? y  on four unique, manrled orb i ters  f o r  sole acceCs t o  space for a l l  
nat ional  security space systems. GOD studies and other independent evaludtions 
have concluded that t h i s  does not represent an assured, f l e x i b l e  and responsive 
access t o  space. While t he  GOD i s  f u l l y  ccnmnitted t o  the STS, t o t a l  re l iance 
upon the STS f o r  sole access t o  space .in view o f  the technical and operational 
uncertaint ies, represents an unacceptable nat ional  secur i ty r i s k .  
sjstem i s  necessary t o  provide high confidence o f  access t o  sgace p a r t i c u l a r l y  
since the Shuttle w i l l  be the only launch vehicle f o r  a l l  US space users. 
acidition, the l imi ted number of unique, manned Shutt le vehicles renders them ill- 
suited and inap.?ropriate for use i n  a high r i s k  environment. 
a high degree o f  requirements satisfact ion, low technical r i s k ,  sad reasonab?e 
schedule ava i l ab i l i t y .  
A complementary 
I n  
?he solut ion t o  this problem must be affordable and ef fect ive and yet  offer 
lhmanned, expendable launch vehicles meet these c r i t e r i a  
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and satisfy DoD operational needs for a 1aunr.h system which complements the 
STS and extends our ability to conduct launch operations further into the 
spectrum of conflict. These systems can provide unique and assured launch 
capabilities in peace, crisis and conflict levels short of General Nuclear 
uar. These vehicles are designed to be expendable and the loss of a single 
vehicle affects only that one mission and would not degrade future cOmnOn, 
national launch capabilities by the loss o f  a reuseable launch system. 
The President's policy on the Conmercialiration of Expendable Launch 
Vehicles states that the goals of  the U.S. space launch policy are t o  enc,ure a 
flexible and robust U.S. launch posture, to maintain space transportation leader- 
ship, aud t o  eacourage the U.S. private sector development of comnercial launch 
operations. Consistent with this policy, the DoD will pursue the use of 
comne:.cially procured ELVs to meet it5 requirements far i+:?uinn i t <  xsured 
launch capabilities. For requirements that cannot be satisfied by comnercially 
available ELVs, unique Do0 developments may be undertaken for special purpose 
launch capabili Lies. 
The STS will remain the primary launch system for routine DoD launch 
services. Unzanned, expendable launch vehicles represent a complementary 
capability to the STS and will be maintained and routinely launched t o  ensure 
their operational viability. 
payloads nil? be identified for dedicated launch on ELVs, tut will remain 
compatible with the STS. 
To accomplish this, selected national security 
Lon Term While comercial expendable launch vehicles represent an 
affordab + e aF3 available so?ution to the unique DoD space launch requiremefits 
into the earlj-l990s, the need for other Do0 launch capabilities to nee? require- 
ments beyond then must be evaluated and validated. This effort must be initiated 
i m d i a t e l y  in order t o  ensure that future natioral security space misiions 
are not constrained by inadequate launch capability. The evaluation should 
examine potential Dd) launch requirements, such as the need for a heavy lift 
v?hicle, and should attempt to take maximum advantage of prior investments in 
the U.S. launch vehicle technology base. 
IMPLENENTATION 
As Executive Agent for launch vehicles, the Air Force w i l l  take imwdiate 
action to acquire a commercia:, unmanned, expendable launch venicle capability 
to complement the STS with a first launch availability no later than FY 1988. 
These vehicles lust provide a launch capability essentially equal to the orig- 
inal STS weight and volume specifications. 
In addition, the Air Force, in conjunction and coordination with other 
Services, affected agencies and departments, will: 
a: identify specific natisnai security systems that will be 
used on the commercially procured expendable launch 
vehicles and the proposed peacetime launch rate required 
to maintain an operationally responsive posture. 
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b)  develop a comprehensive space launch plan t o  meet projectea 
This national security requirements through the year 2000. 
s'tategy will be submitted t o  the Secretary of Defense for 
approval and validation. 
The Defense Space Launch Strategy wf 11 be re f lec ted  i n  the FY-86 Defense 
Guidance Plan. 
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